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This paper explores the syndrome of dementia and the way in which it affects a person’s capacity 
to make a medical decision.  The symptoms of dementia exist along a continuum, meaning that a 
patient will begin with a mild form of dementia and then progress to a more severe form of this 
syndrome.  This paper argues that although demented patients generally do not have the capacity 
to make medical decisions, some demented patients, because of the continuum nature of the 
syndrome, can participate in the planning of their care and, in some cases, participate in the 
informed consent process.  It maintains that the principles of respect for autonomy and dignity, 
beneficence, and justice provide ethical reasons for involving demented patients in the care when 
they are capable to do so.  Moreover, this paper contends that ageism, sexism, and 
hypercognitivism are biases that likely affect the way in which physicians view their demented 
patients, and consequently, the intersectionality of these three biases may play a role in a 
physician’s disregard for an elderly demented patient’s involvement in the planning of their care.  
Finally, the way in which physicians’ interpret the idea of “involvement” provides further 
reasons to explain why physicians sometimes exclude demented patients in participating in 
decisionmaking.  This paper concludes by providing some suggestions for positively involving 
demented patients in care planning.     
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1.0  CHAPTER ONE 
During the fall of my second year of graduate education, I participated in a practicum to facilitate 
my training in bioethics.  During this practicum, I had the opportunity to shadow physicians of a 
local hospital on a service specializing in geriatric care.  As one might expect, these physicians 
saw a large number of patients suffering from dementia.  As I saw patient after patient come into 
the hospital for care, it was not long before I noticed a disturbing trend.  Demented patients, 
regardless of the severity of their dementia, were rarely included in conversations in which their 
medical problems and treatments were being discussed and addressed.  This observation was 
troubling, yet intriguing.       
The National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke and the U.S. Congress Office 
of Technology Assessment estimate that approximately 6.8 million people in the United States 
are living with dementia and it is projected that 1.8 million of those individuals are living with a 
severe form of dementia ("Dementia:  Hope Through Research," 2007).  There is an additional 
number people who are affected by this syndrome as a result of witnessing a loved one suffer 
from their diminishing mental state.  Because of the high prevalence of dementia, it is important 
that in addition to the great loss of cognitive capabilities that demented individuals experience 
through their struggle with dementia, they do not also lose the opportunity to make decisions or 
express preferences for their medical treatment when they remain capable of doing so. 
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Relying on published literature, this paper establishes that symptoms of dementia exist as 
a continuum, and argues that this continuum nature of dementia needs to be properly assessed 
and appreciated by medical professionals.  It then argues that although a significant portion of 
dementia patients cannot make informed medical decisions, many still possess the ability to 
express to family, friends, and their medical staff their preferences and values in regard to their 
lives, that these expressions can be useful to those making decisions on their behalf, and thus, 
that it is ethically incumbent upon medical professionals to solicit these expressions and take 
them into account.  Ethical warrant for allowing these patients to participate in medical decision 
making is based on the principles of respect for autonomy and human dignity, beneficence, and 
justice.  Finally, this paper explores the reasons why physicians often fail to include demented 
patients in conversations about their care or in the informed consent process and provides an 
ethical analysis of plausible explanations for this phenomenon. 
1.1 DISTINGUISHING KEY CONCEPTS:  DECISIONAL CAPACITY, 
AUTONOMY, AND DIGNITY 
Decisional capacity1 is a prerequisite for decision making in a variety of contexts, including 
health care decision making.  Accordingly, the assessment of such ability is vital to the medical 
 
1 Decisional capacity and competence are distinguished by the setting in which the concepts are used.  
Decisional capacity is a determination made by medical and health professionals, while competence is a legal 
assessment (Parker and Samakar, 2004).  In this paper both terms are used to refer to a person’s ability to perform a 
specific task, namely, decision making. 
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field.  The determination of whether a person possesses decisional capacity establishes whether 
she has the ability to make an informed decision and whether others have the obligation to 
respect her decision.  Thus, the evaluation of decisional capacity acts as a system of gate-keeping 
for informed decisions and is required for a physician to respect a patient’s preferences regarding 
treatments (Parker and Samakar, 2004). 
The syndrome of dementia inhibits decisional capacity and consequently prevents most 
demented individuals from making competent informed decisions.  In order to understand how 
dementia affects decisional capacity or decisionmaking capacity and the role that decision 
making plays in health care, one must understand what it means to possess and use decisional 
capacity.   
There are four abilities that one must possess to be able to make an informed medical 
decision.  First, one must have the ability to understand the information that is material to 
making a decision; in medicine, the decision is frequently in regard to a potential treatment.  
During the disclosure component of the informed consent process, the information disclosed 
must include the patient’s diagnosis, the prognosis associated with treatment, and all alternatives 
to the treatment including the option of forgoing treatment.  Additionally, the physician must 
disclose the risks and benefits of the treatment and each alternative to having the treatment, as 
well as the physician’s recommendation regarding the decision.  After the patient receives all the 
material information regarding the proposed treatment, she must have the ability to apply this 
information to her own life and evaluate the alternatives against her own beliefs, values, and 
preferences.  This appreciation and evaluation requires the abilities to reason and deliberate.  In 
other words, the person must be able to project or envision the consequences of each potential 
course of action based on the information provided and be able to determine which alternative is 
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most compatible with her current way of life and desired future way of life.  Therefore, it is 
important that the person’s set of values and preferences be reasonably constant so that she can 
weigh options in light of these values and preferences.  Finally, the person must have the ability 
to communicate the decision made. Communication can be aided for patients who are incapable 
of oral communication, for example, by providing writing materials (Buchanan and Brock, 
1990).  To have decisional capacity is to be able to have goals and values, understand 
information, weigh options according to one’s own preferences and values, and communicate a 
decision.  
In health care, decisional capacity or competence is not assessed to determine a global 
attribute of a person, but rather her decisionmaking ability in relation to a specific decision.  
Consequently, a competence determination cannot be made unless the particular decision is 
specified.  A person may have the capacity to make one decision, while lacking the ability to 
make another decision.  Moreover, at a certain time, a person may not have the capability to 
make a particular decision, but at different time and under different circumstances, may have the 
competence to make the decision she was unable to make previously (Faden and Beauchamp, 
1986).  This is an essential point when considering decisional capacity and dementia.   
Examination of the process of competent decision making reveals the relationship 
between decisional capacity and autonomy.  ‘Autonomy’, from the Greek words auto, meaning 
the self, and nomos, meaning rule, is a term that can be traced back to ancient Greece where it 
once referred to self governance in the city-state.  In moral philosophy, autonomy now refers to 
self-determination (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986).  To have autonomy is to have rule of oneself, 
including being able to make decisions without undue constraints caused by insufficient 
understanding or undue pressure from restrictive influences (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989).  
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When others are obligated to respect the competent decision of a patient, the patient is allowed to 
be self-ruling with regard to her care and her bodily integrity.  The components of the informed 
consent process are designed to provide the patient with the information and to ensure the 
absence of controlling influence by others necessary for the patient to be self-ruling.     
The notion of autonomy applies not only to persons, but also to actions, and in bioethics 
it is the autonomy of actions-specifically, the autonomous nature of specific medical decisions- 
that has received the most analysis (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989) (Faden and Beauchamp, 
1986).  An autonomous person is one who generally possesses the capability to act 
independently and to be in control of the decisions that affect her life, while an autonomous 
action is one that exhibits the agent’s use of this capability on a particular occasion (Faden and 
Beauchamp, 1986).  It is certainly possible for an autonomous person to make a non-autonomous 
decision, because the general capacity to act autonomously is not a guarantee that one always has 
autonomy or will act autonomously.  A nonautonomous action can be performed by a generally 
autonomous person on the basis of ignorance in regard to the particular decision or because of 
duress from outside sources.  In a medical context, it is possible that an autonomous patient fails 
to be competent to give an informed consent for a particular treatment or medical technique as a 
result of symptoms of her illness, anxiety, or other such factors.  Faden and Beauchamp believe 
that there are three criteria necessary in order for a person to act autonomously.  A person has 
acted autonomously if she has acted intentionally, with understanding, and without controlling 
influences (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986).  Because the latter two criteria can be exhibited in 
degrees, Faden and Beauchamp argue that an action can be more or less autonomous, i.e., that 
autonomous actions admit of degrees. 
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On the other hand, it is also possible, in certain circumstances, for a generally 
nonautonomous person to make an autonomous decision.  For example, children are not 
normally considered autonomous agents and competent decisionmakers, especially when it 
comes to medical decision making.  The decisions and choices made by are child not typically 
held as binding.  However, suppose a young child were asked whether or not she wished to have 
chocolate or vanilla ice cream.  She looked at her the two choices before her, thought for a 
moment, and then chose chocolate.  The child understood the particulars of the decision.  If she 
wished to have ice cream then she would have to decide which flavor she wished to have being 
that her choice was either chocolate or vanilla.  She could not choose strawberry.  She selected 
the chocolate intentionally after deliberation and without any particular person forcing her to 
select chocolate.  It can be said that she acted with understanding, with intention, and without 
controlling influences.  As a result, the child, usually considered nonautonomous, made an 
autonomous decision.  This point is significant because of its relevance to the capability of a 
demented patient.  A demented patient, who is generally nonautonomous, may have the ability to 
make some autonomous and competent decisions about matters that are pertinent to her care and 
quality of life, even if she is not competent to make treatment decisions. 
Moreover, if we think of autonomy somewhat more broadly and in a way that Faden and 
Beauchamp specifically disavow in their analysis of autonomy in medical decision making, we 
can find other reasons to consider autonomy in the context of decision making for and with 
generally nonautonomous demented patients.  Faden and Beauchamp deny that authenticity for 
autonomy should be required for informed consent because they believe that authenticity is too 
high a standard for autonomous decision making.  If unlike Faden and Beachamp we think of 
autonomy in terms of authenticity, in terms of what makes one person a unique individual, then it 
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may be possible to think of different decisions as being more or less appropriate to (or reflective 
of) those features that distinguish the patient as a person.  It may make sense to say that, even in 
the absence of the deliberative abilities necessary for decisional capacity, a demented patient’s 
preferences may nevertheless be more or less authentic and her expression of them may be 
deemed an attempt to be self-ruling.  Some expressions of a preference, for example, a choice of 
ice cream flavor may be a “mere” expression of preference.  Other expressions of preference 
may be more enduring, may reflect the patient’s deeper values and interests, or may seem to 
reflect the patient’s more fundamental features of the patient’s current self (for example, never to 
be bothered during a favorite television program, or never to paired at dinner with a particular 
fellow patient).  In some cases, there will be continuity in values, preferences, or aspects of 
character and personality from the patient’s pre-dementia state into her period of dementia; her 
family and friends may consider those values, preferences, and traits to be the “authentic” ones, 
as they are part of the fabric of their relationship and interactions with the patient.  Balancing 
respect for the values and interests of the enduring, authentic self (the pre-dementia person who 
becomes demented) and those of the current authentic self (the patient who is demented) is one 
of the challenges of decision making in this context, and a challenge beyond the scope of this 
analysis.  The issue is raised, however, to point to the multiple notions of autonomy relevant to 
thinking about the involvement of demented patients in their care:  the autonomous character of 
both decisions and of persons, and autonomy considered as self-rule or as authenticity. 
However it is conceived, strictly as self-rule or also as something akin to authenticity, 
autonomy is considered a good, something of value.  As a value, it is the foundation of the 
ethical principle of respect for autonomy, more appropriately deemed respect for persons or 
respect for dignity (The Belmont Report:  Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
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Human Subjects of Research., 1979).  To demonstrate respect for a person’s autonomy, as 
defined by Faden and Beauchamp, is “to recognize with due appreciation that person’s capacities 
and perspective, including his or her right to hold certain views, to make certain choices, and to 
take certain actions based on personal values and beliefs” (pg. 8).  Therefore, to infringe upon 
another person’s autonomy would be to disregard her values and preferences and instead impose 
one’s own values and preferences (Beauchamp and Childress, 1989).   
Although the value of autonomy is the basis for the principle requiring respect for 
persons, fulfilling this principle does not entail merely respecting another’s right of self-rule.  
The principle of respect for persons encompasses two major ideas.  To evidence respect for 
persons is, first, to recognize and respect the autonomy of those who are indeed autonomous and, 
second, to protect the interests or welfare, and respect the dignity or inherent worth, of those who 
are not autonomous (The Belmont Report:  Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection 
of Human Subjects of Research., 1979).  However, the word ‘protection’ can employ multiple 
meanings.  In some cases, such protection involves providing for the material needs of those who 
cannot provide for them themselves, as parents protect and provide for children.  In some cases, 
respect for persons requires protecting generally autonomous persons from their own 
nonautonomous actions, as when a drunk friend is prevented from driving home or generally a 
autonomous person is deemed incompetent to make a medical decision because her anxiety 
prevents her from adequately understanding relevant details about her proposed treatment.  Most 
importantly, one can protect a person by acknowledging and respecting her needs and showing 
respect for her dignity or inherent value as a person.   
The word ‘dignity’ comes from the Latin words dignus and dignita (Schulman, 2005).  
Having dignity, in the general sense, can mean having self-respect and being valued by others 
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(Lothian and Philp, 2001).  However, the role dignity plays in bioethics is not exactly clear.  
There seem to be four different, but interrelated accounts of dignity.  Ancient Greek and Roman 
literature defines dignity as “worthiness for honor and esteem.”  This classical concept of dignity 
describes an individual who represents superiority and honor (Schulman, 2005).  In the biblical 
sense, dignity results from the account that man is made in the image of god and as a result that 
humans are in a sense “godlike.” As a result, they are provided an intrinsic dignity or value.  This 
notion of dignity encourages individuals to value others as God would value them (Schulman, 
2005), and this Judeo-Christian conception of dignity seems to be incorporated in many 
references to the dignity of person in the bioethical context and even in health policy (Bioethics, 
2002).   
Immanuel Kant described dignity as the inherent worth belonging to all rational persons.  
Kant’s emphasis on rationality as the basis for dignity fits neatly with bioethics’ emphasis on 
decisionmaking ability.  According to Kant, persons have dignity as a result of their autonomy; 
therefore, Kant has difficulty accommodating, in his moral philosophy, respect for children, the 
demented, and others who lack autonomy and especially those who will never develop autonomy 
(Kant, 1998).  Finally, dignity can be understood in terms of 20th century constitutions and 
international declarations as a belief in a person’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness or to life, liberty, and property (Schulman, 2005).  Some of these expressions refer to 
the need for governments and societies to provide the material conditions necessary for people to 
pursue their life plans, to craft authentic lives or at least live minimally decent ones.  The 
inherent worth of the person, her capacity for crafting a life that is her own, is considered in itself 
to exert a demand on others to provide basic, minimal conditions necessary for the exercise of 
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this capacity.  Here the dignity of people rests less with their rationality and more with their 
unique capabilities as human persons and their potential to lead authentic lives as individuals.   
This paper will consider dignity to be the inherent worth of a human being without regard 
for his or her cognitive abilities or capacity for autonomous action.  Daniel Callahan, for 
example, argues that autonomy is not the basis of human dignity; it is simply one element 
comprising it.  He states, “The value of a human life should never be confused with the right or 
capacity to make choices, to direct our own lives, or to be free as citizens and persons” 
(Callahan, 2002) (pg. 129).  In fact, it might be said that valuing the autonomy of person, is only 
respecting one of her four needs, specifically, her cognitive need.  People also have an emotional 
need, i.e., a need to have love, support, and care from others and the need to communicate 
feelings and emotions.  They also have a need for relationships with other people that are filled 
with respect, commitment, dependability, and affection.  Lastly, people have a value need, which 
is the need not only to develop and hold values, beliefs, and preferences, but also to have these 
respected by others (Callahan, 2002).    
The next section explores dementia and its effects on decisional capacity and 
competence. It is possible for one to respect and care for demented patients who are not 
autonomous or capable of decision making by remembering that, in spite of their lack of 
autonomy, they are still people whose dignity should to be acknowledged and respected.   
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1.2 DEMENTIA AND DECISIONAL CAPACITY 
The National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke and the U.S. Congress Office of 
Technology Assessment estimate that approximately 6.8 million people in the United States are 
living with dementia, and it is projected that 1.8 million of those individuals are living with a 
severe form of dementia ("Dementia:  Hope Through Research," 2007).   Alzheimer’s disease, 
affecting roughly 4.5 million Americans, is the most common cause of dementia among the 
elderly, defined as those age 65 years and older. One in every ten elderly individuals is affected 
by Alzheimer’s disease.  Additionally, of those individuals considered very elderly, age 85 years 
and older, approximately half are affected by Alzheimer’s disease ("The Numbers Count:  
Mental Disorders in America," 2006).  Alzheimer’s disease is associated with 60 % of all cases 
of dementia ("Dementia," 2007).  While dementia is common among the very elderly, it is not 
believed to be a normal part of the aging process ("Dementia:  Hope Through Research," 2007). 
Dementia is defined as a loss of cognitive functioning, such as rational thinking, memory, 
reasoning, language, and certain motor skills that is severe enough to hinder the way in which a 
person experiences and conducts her daily life and relationships.  Dementia is a syndrome, a 
group of symptoms, rather than a disease itself, though it may accompany certain diseases or 
conditions.  Many of these symptoms involve changes in the person’s memory, in which she 
forgets familiar places and people.  Demented persons also experience changes in their mood and 
feel anger and fear in reaction to the alterations that are occurring to their memory as a result of 
their dementia.  Furthermore, demented persons often experience a change in their ability to 
communicate, such as being at a loss for words when trying to speak or a decrease in their 
capability to write or read ("Facts about Dementia," 2007).   A dementia diagnosis is made only 
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if consciousness remains while two or more brain functions are severely impaired ("Dementia:  
Hope Through Research," 2007). 
Minor memory loss can be a result of normal aging.  However, a person may be 
experiencing, or be at increased risk for, dementia if she is unable to make new memories; relies 
considerably on memory helpers; finds difficulty or confusion with familiar words, people, 
places or actions; experiences loss of interest in responsibilities or hobbies; or begins to make 
bad judgments or decisions that are uncharacteristic ("Facts about Dementia," 2007). 
Different pathologic or structural changes that occur in the brain differentiate the types of 
dementia ("Dementia," 2007).  Among the elderly and very elderly, dementia is typically caused 
by nerve cell degeneration such as in the case Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s disease.   
Alzheimer’s disease is a result of the death of neurons in the cortex area of the brain, the area of 
the brain responsible for memory.  Parkinson’s disease, on the other hand, is caused by an excess 
of the neurotransmitter dopamine in the brain, the neurotransmitter responsible for movement.  
These types of dementias are related to age and are progressive, irreversible, and incurable.  
Dementia with Lewy Bodies, primarily connected to Parkinson’s disease, but also appearing to 
have a link to Alzheimer’s disease, is a dementia that is differentiated from other dementias by 
the appearance of tiny protein structures found on nerve cells within the brain.  These protein 
structures, called Lewy Bodies, cause visual hallucinations, delusions, and movement disorders.  
Other incurable causes of dementia are multi-infarct dementia, which describes brain cell death 
due to several small strokes that cause blood supply to be stopped to parts of the brain ("What 
Types of Dementia Are There?," 2007), as well as dementia caused by diseases such as HIV or 
Huntington’s disease, and by infections affecting the spinal cord and brain like Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease ("Facts about Dementia," 2007). 
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Although not common in the elderly, there are many forms of dementia which can be 
treated and cured.  These include dementia resulting from nutritional deficiencies and metabolic 
disorders, operable tumors, infections, hormone imbalance and dementias resulting from long-
term substance abuse ("Dementia," 2007).  Additionally, head injury, reactions to medications, 
poisoning, anoxia or hypoxia, and heart and lung problems are causes of dementia that may be 
treated and cured ("Dementia:  Hope Through Research," 2007).  Although most of the 
dementias that affect the elderly cannot be cured, there are some medications, including Aricept, 
Exelon, and Reminyl, that can partly or temporarily lessen the symptoms ("Facts about 
Dementia," 2007).  Dementias affecting elderly people are normally progressive, and depending 
on the type of dementia, the syndrome can progress slowly over many years.  This is usually the 
case for Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease, the dementias that are most prevalent 
among the elderly ("Dementia," 2007).   
Due to the progressive nature of dementia, the symptoms can be viewed as presenting a 
continuum or spectrum of severity.  At one end of the spectrum, a demented person could simply 
be misplacing her keys or forgetting the time of her doctor’s appointment, while at the other end 
of the spectrum, the person could fail to recall family and close friends or mistake them for 
others.  The experience and progression of dementia is unique for each person.  At one of the 
continuum, mildly demented persons may retain the capacity to make decisions regarding their 
lives, whereas at the opposite end of the continuum, the severely demented may lack competence 
completely.  In order for one to have the capacity to make a medical decision, one must be able 
to understand the information relating to the decision.  Much of the time, dementia causes such a 
decrease in cognitive functioning that a demented patient can longer comprehend the information 
provided to her from a medical professional.  Or, in the event that she can understand, dementia 
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may prevent her memory from retaining the information.  Additionally, to be able to make a 
medical decision or give informed consent, one must have the ability to express values and 
preferences and in turn, apply those values to a decision.  Dementia may inhibit persons from 
executing the reasoning skills necessary to make a decision of this sort.  Thus, many demented 
individuals lack decisional capacity necessary for medical decision making (Buchanan and 
Brock, 1990).   
As a result of the continuum or spectrum-like nature of the symptoms comprising 
dementia, it is essential for medical professionals to continuously assess the capabilities and 
competence of their demented patients, as a way to ensure they are respecting their patients’ 
autonomy to the extent that it still exists.  Although physicians may find that few demented 
individuals have the capacity to make medical decisions, even in the latter stages of their 
dementia, patients may have the ability to value and express preferences about their lives.  The 
final section of this chapter argues that demented patients can express their values and 
preferences in regard to their care and that they should be encouraged to do so.  The goal of this 
final section is to explore the ethical reasons that medical professionals should involve demented 
patients in their care. 
1.3 ETHICAL REASONS TO INCLUDE DEMENTED PATIENTS IN THEIR CARE 
Most often individuals suffering from dementia do not possess the decisional capacity necessary 
to make the series of informed decisions that arise across the course of their long-term care.  
However, there are reasons that it is ethically appropriate to include such individuals both in 
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decision making insofar as possible, and more generally in the planning of their care.  Discussion 
of these reasons will be organized in relation to the ethical principles of respect for autonomy 
and human dignity, beneficence, and justice.  
It has been established that most elderly individuals who suffer from dementia are no 
longer autonomous agents.  Yet some may be able to make some autonomous decisions or at 
least to express their preferences in ways that are relevant to health care decisions and other 
decisions relevant to their quality of life.  Because of the continuum-like symptoms of dementia, 
it is possible that a demented individual may have the capacity to make a decision or participate 
in a conversation when decisions are being made, despite her general lack of autonomy.  The 
principle of respect for autonomy provides ethical justification for allowing demented patients to 
make the decisions that they are capable of making.  Someone who lacks the capability to make a 
treatment decision may nevertheless be capable of expressing a preference about, or making a 
decision regarding, a sunny or shady room in a long-time care facility.  Someone who is not 
competent to refuse to take her medication may nevertheless be competent to refuse liver and 
onions for dinner.     
Buchanan and Brock discuss the idea of a decision-relative standard for competence, 
meaning that a judgment of whether a person is competent to make a decision is based upon the 
person’s capacities, as well as upon actual elements of the decision including the amount of risk 
involved and the information requisite for making the decision.  This particular standard views 
competence in terms of a threshold.  A decision-relative standard of competence asserts that 
competence should be more thoroughly assessed (i.e. have a higher threshold) for decisions that 
bear more risk.  For example, a decision to reject a recommended treatment would require a 
higher threshold of competence than the decision to accept a recommended treatment.  The idea 
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of competence determination involving a threshold that one either attain or not results from the 
sorting function that competence determination plays:  it sorts decisions into those that must be 
respected by physicians and those that may perhaps be overridden for the sake of protecting the 
patient’s welfare interests.  A patient either is or is not competent to make a particular decision.    
The idea of requiring a higher threshold for a riskier decision again stems from the desire to 
afford protection to patient’s welfare interests; the riskier decision exposes the patient to a larger 
range or degree of harms.  Furthermore, a decision that yields more risk will frequently involve 
more information and therefore require a greater level of understanding than a less risky decision 
(Buchanan and Brock, 1990).   
This way of conceptualizing competence for decision making supports the participation 
of demented elders in their care.  An elderly demented patient may not have the level or degree 
of competence required to make a decision about whether or not undergo a surgical procedure, a 
decision that bears much risk, but may attain the threshold of competence to make a decision 
about whether or not she wishes to eat her dinner inside or out on the patio, a decision that has 
very minimal risk.  Despite its minimal risk, however, the decision about dinner venue may have 
substantial impact on the quality of her daily life.  Moreover, being allowed to make the decision 
affords the patient benefits both by being able to avoid conflict regarding where she eats and 
being afforded the opportunity to feel effective in making a decision that is respected.  Although 
it is a relatively small matter, the patient is able to be self-ruling regarding her dinner venue, and 
she is enabled to express and make effective her wishes, to make a small self-authored plan and 
act on it, a small sign of authenticity.           
The principle of respect for human dignity provides further ethical reasons for physicians 
to encourage demented patients to participate in their care.  Although demented patients are 
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generally not considered rational and by some standards would not be deemed worthy of respect 
for their dignity, they are “persons in the social sense” and therefore deserve respect (Jecker, 
1990).  Nancy Jecker argues that social personhood grants moral status by reason of the place 
such individuals hold in the lives of others.  For this reason, she argues, anencephalic infants, and 
by extension, demented elderly individuals are considered persons.  According to Jecker, there 
are three reasons to support granting the status of social personhood to demented individuals.  
First, it is argued that this practice of assigning social personhood is justified if it produces more 
good than harm.  Viewing demented individuals as persons, and thereby as moral agents worthy 
of respect, would only help to strengthen the argument that demented elders should be included 
in the planning of their care.  Subsequent paragraphs will suggest that material benefits result 
from such inclusion and help establish that respect for the demented and their inclusion in care 
planning are two essential goods that seem to outweigh possible harms, such as confusion of the 
patient as a result of the complex medical information. 
Second, just like anencephalic infants, demented elders are the subject of human tragedy 
(Jecker, 1990).  It is a tragedy, after a lifetime of having the capacity to make decisions and be in 
control of oneself, to slowly lose this ability to dementia.  The loss of this capacity evokes a 
certain sense of grief and sadness among people regarding these patients that would not be 
evoked with regard to nonpersons.  The final reason to accord social personhood status to the 
demented elderly is that they are human (Jecker, 1990).  Severely demented patients have lost a 
sense of their prior selves.  However, despite their loss of cognitive abilities, by virtue of being 
human, demented patients have inherent worth.  They have human dignity in the sense Callahan 
identifies.  As a result, demented patients are people who deserve respect and attention paid to 
their needs.  By merely including a demented patient in the planning of her care and encouraging 
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her to make treatment decisions when possible, her cognitive, emotional, relational, and value 
needs can be met.    
Moreover, the ethical requirement of beneficence provides ethical warrant for including 
demented patients in decisions about their care.  Based on the principle of beneficence, a medical 
professional should act in a way that promotes the welfare of her patients.  Her actions should 
not impose harm, but aim to prevent and eliminate harm when possible. Specifically, she should 
not inflict unnecessary pain, injury, or disability, but rather work to eliminate disease and 
suffering when possible (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986).  First of all, autonomy and beneficence 
typically work in concert.  Patients who are autonomous are more likely than others (including 
doctors) to make decisions about their care that are in accordance with their values and interests 
because only the patient truly knows her values and beliefs and which decision is most 
compatible with such beliefs.  A decision that is contrary to such values can cause hurt and 
detriment to a patient.   By providing the proper information to a patient, a patient who has 
decisional capacity can make the most appropriate decision regarding her care.  Thus, by 
obtaining informed consent, the physician can be said to be helping to promote her welfare and 
preventing harm caused by making a decision contrary to the patient’s values. 
Although most dementia patients lack the decisional capacity to make informed decisions 
about their care, the principle of beneficence still supports involving them in their care planning 
to the extent possible.  First, if a physician regularly assesses a patient, diagnosed with dementia, 
to determine whether she has the capacity to make an impending medical decision, the clinician 
can prevent undue harm caused by failure to recognize the remaining decisional capacity of the 
patient when it is present.  If it is determined that such patients do not possess the capacity to 
make an informed decision, a physician can solicit preferences from a demented patient which 
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can be used by clinical staff and the patient’s family to help make a decisions on her behalf and 
otherwise direct her care in a way that maximally accords with her values.  By encouraging the 
patient’s participation in her care and in the planning of her care, the physician is acting to 
promote the welfare of the patient by allowing her care to reflect her authentic self to the degree 
possible and by allowing her the material benefits resulting from the process of participating in 
her care. 
One of these material benefits is that the involvement of a demented patient in her care 
promotes her welfare by making her feel as if she has control over her care.  Whether or not the 
demented patient is the ultimate decision maker, treating the patient as though she is a participant 
in the decisionmaking process promotes the welfare of the patient by making her believe that the 
medical decisions that were made were a result of choices that she made, rather than a decision 
that was made for her or forced upon her.  This may encourage the patient to more fully comply 
with the treatment decision.  This line of reasoning reflects the reasons Carl Schneider discusses 
in his analysis of the therapeutic argument for involving patients in medical decision making, 
indeed for having them exercise decisional authority whenever possible (Schneider, 1998).  
Undertaking to make a demented patient feel as though she is participating in her care, even 
though she is not the ultimate decision maker, may seem deceptive.  However, if the physician 
and family of the patient are actually working to include the patient in her care by actively 
soliciting her preferences and values, they are not deceiving the patient.  These preferences and 
values are used by the medical staff and family of the patient to help make decisions and direct 
the patient’s care, thus the patient is a participant in her care.   
Additionally, allowing a patient to feel that she has some control over her care, may work 
almost like a self-fulfilling prophecy.  “The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false 
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definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception 
come ‘true’ ” (Merton, 1968)(pg. 477).  This is the effect that sometimes occurs with demented 
patients who are afforded a greater degree of control over their lives than if all decisions are 
made for them without their input.  Although a demented elderly patient may not be making the 
final decision or choice in regard to her care, by treating her like she is participating in the 
planning of her care, she believes that she is participating.  This sense of control and 
participation helps her to more fully comply with the treatment, thereby helping her to improve 
medically.  In the case of other, treatable diagnoses, adherence to a treatment regimen promotes  
more rapid return to health (Schneider, 1998).  In the case of most elderly demented patients, 
pre-dementia health can never be restored.  Nevertheless, their being more compliant with other 
treatment for secondary conditions may result in faster recovery, while being cooperative with 
care-givers’ instructions may lead to their receiving better care-giving, as well as a more pleasant 
interaction with their care-givers.  Thus, giving patients, including those with some cognitive 
impairment, a sense of participation and a sense of having control over and responsibility for 
their environment, may in itself enhance their quality of life.   
Finally, participation in the dialogue involved in medical decision making and care 
planning may help to prevent, or at least help lessen, the decline in their cognitive capacity and 
have other positive health benefits.  Regardless of whether a demented patient retains sufficient 
cognitive ability to be able to make an informed decision, receiving information about her care 
from her physician or other medical professional and having her input solicited may promote, 
however slightly, a process of thought and deliberation, and even possible understanding about 
her situation.  Increased understanding may at least temporarily counter the confusion about 
surroundings, interventions, and daily routines that often plagues demented patients.  Although 
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the understanding may not persist long past the conversation or perhaps may not persist at all, the 
thought and deliberation evoked by this type of conversation may help to preserve what 
cognitive skills persist, thereby serving to satisfy the patient’s cognitive need.  Participation in 
the care planning discussion serves to address the patient’s emotional and relational needs. 
By being involved in the planning of her care, ideally, the demented patient may begin to 
form a bond with her physician, a bond that was conceivably lost as a result of the dementia or 
that may never have existed in the first place.  The formation of this bond is a result of the 
recognition and acceptance, by both the physician and the patient, of the care relationship. As 
described by Joan Tronto, the care relationship includes four phases: caring about, taking care of, 
care-giving, and care-receiving (Tronto, 1993).   
In the “caring about” phase, a need for care is acknowledged.  In a physician and patient 
care relationship, the patient and often the patient’s family recognize a problem or suspect a need 
for care may exist and seek assistance from a physician to meet this need.  The physician 
examines the patient and decides whether care is, in fact, necessary and whether the need is 
something that can be “taken care of” given the state of medical science, expertise of the 
physician, and level of resources, such as money, time, emotional resources, and workload, of 
the parties involved.  Second, in the “taking care of” phase, the responsibility to attempt to meet 
the need for care is assumed by the physician, and she decides how she will act to address the 
unmet needs of the patient.  This phase of caring should include input from the patient in the 
form of her expression of values and preferences in regard to the care the physician will provide.  
This is the phase of the care relationship in which, ideally, the bond with the physician is truly 
formed.  When conversations are taking place in regard to the care of the patient with the patient 
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instead of about the patient, she may feel a greater sense of loyalty and commitment to her care 
on the part of her physician.  Thus the physician, in part, satisfies her relational need. 
Moreover, as part of this conversation with the patient, the physician should invite the 
patient to express preferences about her care, even if she lacks the capacity to retain decisional 
authority.  By inquiring about her values and preferences, the physician provides an opportunity 
for the patient to communicate her values, even if only implicitly, to her physician and family, 
thereby satisfying what Callahan would term the patient’s value need.  Moreover, this 
conversation may also offer the patient the opportunity to express not only her values and 
preferences, but also her feelings and emotions about her dementia.  In return, the physician and 
the patient’s family can provide comfort and support and in doing so, help to satisfy the patient’s 
emotional need.    
“Care-giving,” the third phase, includes the actual meeting of needs.  In a medical 
relationship, this phase may involve performing a procedure, providing treatment, or prescribing 
medication to meet the physical, medical needs of the patient.  In addition, the emotional, 
relational, and value needs of the patient may be met if care is given in a way that respects the 
patient’s dignity and inherent worth, expresses kindness and regard, provides a feeling of 
relatedness, and respects the values and preferences expressed by the patient. 
The final phase of caring is the “care-receiving” phase in which the object of the care, the 
patient, responds to the care she has received.  This phase is important because it provides 
evidence of whether the need of the patient has been fulfilled (Tronto, 1993).  The patient’s 
willingness to receive care may be increased by her participation in the plans for care.  If she 
does not participate in her care planning, changes in her treatment (for example, a new 
medication or a move to a different room or facility) may take the patient by surprise and be 
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disruptive to what understanding she has of her situation.  If instead, she is at least kept informed 
of proposed changes, or allowed to participate in decisions about her care to the extent she is 
capable, then she may be more likely to receive care in the beneficial mode in which it is offered.  
To the extent that a patient’s understanding can be fostered, misunderstanding of care-givers 
motives and actions can be avoided. 
Even patients whose dementia is so severe that they cannot understand explanations of 
their care plans, and who certainly cannot contribute reliable opinions about their own care, can 
nevertheless benefit indirectly from being included in some limited ways in their care planning.  
Treating a patient as though she deserves an explanation of what is happening to her evidences 
respect for her inherent worth as a person.  Therefore, it is respectful to say, even to a patient 
who may not comprehend, “Mrs. Jones, we are going to take you to the gynecologist today for 
your annual examination.  Dr. Brown wants to be sure that you are just as healthy as you were 
last year.  We do not want you to be sick.”  Of course, if such a description upsets a severely 
demented patient who likely does not understand what is said, then a care-provider may 
justifiably avoid discussion.  Other patients, however, may be comforted to know that someone 
is speaking to them as they are being moved from one place to another.  Moreover, those 
surrounding the patient witness the patient being treated respectfully, as a member of the moral 
community, a person in the social sense, and they may be more inclined to care for the patient’s 
interests in virtue of witnessing that treatment.     
The four phases of caring must be achieved for a care need to be fulfilled.  Furthermore, 
working to achieve the requirements of each phase of caring provides the grounds for a bond 
between a patient and her physician.  The physician will recognize both a need for care from her 
patient and her duty to address that need; and, the patient, by participating in the planning of her 
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care, will be better prepared to acknowledge her need for care and to receive the care provided 
by the physician. 
Thus, multiple welfare-oriented reasons support the inclusion of demented patients in 
their care planning.  Doing so helps to meet the demands of the four phases of caring identified 
by Tronto.  Such inclusion also helps to address the four types of basic needs that Callahan 
considers constitutive of human dignity or worth.  Involving demented patients in their care has a 
myriad of practical benefits that may enhance their quality of life and the quality of care-giving 
they receive.  Finally, to the extent that they retain capacity for making some decisions, even if 
they are only competent to make low-risk, quality of life decision (like choice of food, TV 
program, or roommate), providing such demented patients with the opportunity to exercise their 
decisionmaking ability respects their autonomy, may help to preserve such cognitive functions, 
and affords them a sense of control and efficacy, in which most people have an interest.             
A third ethical principle, the principle of justice, also supports involving elderly 
demented patients in their care.  The principle of justice holds that a person should be treated 
“according to what is fair, due, or owed” (Faden and Beauchamp, 1986).  Therefore if a 
competent patient has the right to participate in her healthcare decisions and the planning of her 
care, then justice is served only when such a patient is allowed to exercise this right to make 
decisions.  The failure to respect the remaining, albeit limited, decisional capacity of a demented 
patient by excluding her in decision making and planning of her care is unjust. 
Moreover, justice demands that actions be based upon relevant characteristics.  Justice 
demands, for example, that a worker be hired on the basis of her qualifications, not her 
relationship to the personnel manager, her gender, or her personal beliefs.  Similarly, justice 
requires that respect for a patient’s decision (or opportunities for a patient to give informed 
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consent) be based on relevant characteristics of the patient-namely, her ability to give informed 
consent, her decisional capacity, or competence to make a decision.  If elderly demented patients 
are excluded from decision making about their care simply because of their age or their 
diagnosis, when in fact they possess the relevant capacity to participate in medical decision 
making, then this is contrary to the demands of justice. 
The next chapter will suggest that, in fact, elderly demented patients are frequently 
excluded from medical decision making and from participating in decisions relevant to their care 
because they have certain disempowering characteristics related to their age and sex, and because 
of assumptions made about their cognitive capacity.  Ageism, sexism, and hypercognitivism 
intersect to bring about inequity, to disempower the demented elderly, and to place them at a 
disadvantage in the medical decision making process.  Even the general lack of decisional 
capacity should not lead physicians to avoid involving demented patients in their care, but 
instead the principle of justice, along with the principles of beneficence and respect for persons 
and their inherent worth, should encourage physicians to final alternate ways to include such 
patients in their care. 
The ethical principles of respect for autonomy and human dignity, beneficence, and 
justice provide ethical justification for physicians and other medical professionals to include 
demented patients in the planning and execution of their care, as well as in decision making to 
the best of the patient’s capability.  Nevertheless, physicians often fail to include dementia 
patients in conversations about their care or in the process of informed consent.  Chapter two 
provides an ethical analysis of plausible explanations for this phenomenon. 
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2.0  CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 TREATMENT OF THE ELDERLY AND THE INTERSECTION OF AGEISM, 
SEXISM, AND HYPERCOGNITIVISM 
The first chapter discussed sound ethical reasons why medical professionals should include 
patients suffering from dementia in their care, yet despite these rationales for the involvement of 
such patients, I noted that many physicians fail to do so.  This chapter proposes reasons why 
physicians exclude demented patients from discussions about their care.  Analysis of this 
phenomenon relies on and explicates the notion of the intersectionality of ageism, sexism, and 
hypercognitivism.  Moreover, this chapter examines how physicians’ interpretation of 
“involvement” affects the care they provide to demented patients.    
‘Ageism’ is a term that was coined by Robert Butler in 1968 to describe the “aversion, 
hatred, and prejudice toward the aged and their manifestations in the form of discriminations on 
the basis of age” (Barrow and Smith, 1979) (pg.8).2  Ageist attitudes and the discrimination that 
results from them are a consequence of historical, psychological, social, and cultural forces.  As 
our world is advancing both technologically and industrially, people have to continuously update 
 
2 It is interesting to note that Barrow and Smith’s book, Aging, Ageism, and Society, is over 30 years old.  
Yet, the ideas that are discussed within it, including the chapters on and relating to ageism, are still relevant today.   
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their knowledge and skills in order to maintain their position in their field of work and in their 
life (Barrow and Smith, 1979).  As people get older, they may struggle with their ability to grasp 
and retain new information within their field of work and perhaps also with certain advances that 
affect everyday life.  This struggle may make elderly people seem less valuable within a work 
environment and create or augment the negative attitudes and discrimination already faced by the 
elderly (Barrow and Smith, 1979).   
The fast paced culture of the United States is one that encourages our citizens to be fast 
moving.  This is shown through our favor of “drive-thrus” rather than “sit-down” restaurants and 
our preference for writing emails rather than letters.  We drive at speeds exceeding proper speed 
limits and scorn slow drivers (Barrow and Smith, 1979).  This fast paced culture is frequently not 
conducive to the slower paced movements, thought-processes and interests of the elderly.  Many 
of the elderly do not have either the physical or mental capacities to keep pace with the tempo of 
the dominant culture, thus contributing to the attitudes of ageism, which results in discrimination 
toward the elderly.    
Social changes contribute to ageism through the formulation of a generation gap (Barrow 
and Smith, 1979).  As our world changes socially, the values of the elderly population may 
become slightly or even considerably different from the younger generation’s, thus creating a 
gap in world view, belief system, priorities, attitudes, and value systems.  The United States has 
seen a continuous trend in changing morals and values since the 1960s, a time noted for the 
social changes that occurred.  Since this time, the Supreme Court has legalized abortion, the 
women’s movement exerted political and social influence, feminism provided a critique of social 
relationships previously accepted unreflectively, and drug use has escaped ghettos and found its 
way into middle class lifestyles (Britannica, 2007).  Family structures have diversified making 
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room for the co-habitation of both heterosexual and homosexual couples, as well as, families of 
mixed races and cultures.  The traditional gender roles of a stay-at-home mother and working 
father have been replaced by working mothers and single parent families.  Additionally, the 
number of individuals who divorce each year is only slightly less than half of the number who 
marry per year ("Marriage and Divorce," 2007).  Consequently, the stable 1950s traditional 
family with what were then “conventional values” seems to have become an outdated notion.  
Many of the elderly may still hold onto the traditional values of that period, leading to a conflict 
with the more diverse values of today.  The disagreement in personal values may result in a gap 
between the conflicting groups and in ageist attitudes on the part of each group toward the other, 
but especially on the part of the dominant, younger generation(s) (Barrow and Smith, 1979). 
Finally, psychological factors may contribute to ageism.  The term ‘old’ seems to be a 
detestable term to both the young and the old.  The young fear old age, or perhaps more 
accurately, the young are apprehensive about growing older.  Old is viewed as the polar opposite 
of young, and youth is considered desirable.  According to a type of “dichotomous thinking,” 
what Iris Young terms “the logic of identity,” if one end of a polarity is desirable, the end 
deemed opposite is considered undesirable, worthless, or even detestable.  To be young is to be 
attractive, active, alive, and alluring (Barrow and Smith, 1979).  By this way of thinking, to be 
not-young or old is to be ugly, sedentary, dead, and undesirable.3  Rather than being able to 
recognize a spectrum of age and attributes appropriate to each, according to Young’s analysis of 
 
3 The following three pages summarize Iris Marion Young’s ideas in her book, Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, as they relate to this paper.  The summaries reflect conversations that took place between Dr. Lisa Parker 
and me, and for the most part echo Dr. Parker’s own words.   
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the logic of identity, we fix on the positive attributes of one end and denigrate all attributes that 
are not associated precisely with that desirable pole.  Young focuses her analysis on the dyads of 
male/female and the attributes associated with them: rational/emotional, public/private, 
independent/dependent, forceful/weak, able-bodied/disabled.  Interestingly, many of those 
attributes associated with males and the male sphere are also associated with the young as 
opposed to the old who with age may become more emotionally labile, less cognitively facile 
and acute, less physically vigorous, and more bound to homes and private spaces outside of the 
public eye.  Young’s analysis suggests that dominate patterns of Western thought create 
dichotomies (e.g., male/female, young/old), associate all positive attributes with the dominant 
pole, and then consolidate the power, position, and privilege of those in the dominant position by 
denigrating and assimilating all negative attributes to the non-dominant pole.  This process 
involves ignoring the positive, valuable aspects of the other (“Other”) half of the dichotomous 
pairs.  Even though there are positive, valuable aspects of experiencing emotion and being 
emotional, occupying the private sphere, or being quiet and reflective (rather than constantly 
vigorously active), to secure the powerful social position, those in power tend to consider such 
attributes and activities “lesser.”  Being other-than the dominant good way of being is to be 
lesser.  The Other is devalued and often actively denigrated.  Young argues that this way of 
thinking is a system of thinking, a pervasive way of thinking and viewing the world that is 
difficult to avoid or combat.  Those in a non-dominant position (women, the elderly, the 
disabled) would have to take active steps to get outside of this system of thought or viewpoint.  
Many who are not consciously aware of it simply act to accommodate themselves to it, within 
the system of dichotomous thinking (Young, 1990).  People who avoid disclosing their age to 
others illustrate not only our fear of aging and our fear of being viewed as old by others, but also 
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the way in which those occupying a non-dominant position in a dyad (here, young/old) seek 
accommodation within this oppressive system of dichotomous thinking.  Other examples that 
illustrate both the system of dichotomous thinking and our fear of aging is the “mid-life crisis” or 
the “over 29 syndrome” when the young come to recognize that youth is not everlasting (Barrow 
and Smith, 1979).  Instead of viewing aging positively, as a continuous process that brings 
different positive experiences and challenge along the lifespan, those in early and later mid-life 
view any stage that is not young and thus good as being a crisis or as a pathological syndrome, a 
putative bad. 
The loss of youth may not be the only loss people experience as they age.  In fact, people 
may view aging as a series of losses (Bartky, 1999).  As Sandra Lee Bartky discusses, the losses 
that aging brings may contribute to a person’s fears about aging.  Each person will not 
experience the same losses.  Those who are fortunate may experience very few losses, while 
those who are unfortunate may experience several, perhaps devastating losses.  Of course, even 
this comment embraces a sort of dichotomous thinking.  It might be that many losses bring 
opportunities for personal growth or “clear the decks” for new relationships or experiences, but 
generally the losses associated with growing old are not viewed this way.  Such losses include:  
loss of social groups and professional networks due to retirement and death, loss of a spouse or 
companion, loss of home to live in a retirement community or nursing facility, loss of mental and 
physical abilities including sight and hearing, and finally, loss of life due to death (Bartky, 1999).  
Consequently, the care needs that result from these many losses, especially the loss of mental 
and physical abilities, may create in the elderly a sense of vulnerability and dependence on 
others.  To be vulnerable and dependent on another is to lose some control and power over one’s 
life (Tronto, 1993).  This is yet another loss experienced by people as they age.   
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Upon examining this view of aging as a series of losses, it is no wonder that people are 
apprehensive about growing older.  This apprehension is partly due to the experiences of loss 
themselves, the grief, sadness, and fear associated with the loss of loved ones, familiar 
surroundings and activities, and one’s familiar place and status in the world.  These emotions are 
likely made more negative, more unpleasant to experience, by the dichotomous way of viewing 
each of the events.  If having a life partner, job, career, and home is good, then losing these is 
bad.  If having friends and being physically and socially active in the world is good, then losing 
friends and becoming less active is bad.  Viewing the goods of life as one of a dichotomous pair 
and not considering each good or experience on a continuum contribute to the negative 
experience of the loss of a good.  It may seem impossible to consider having a partner or spouse 
as a continuum experience rather than a yes/no situation in which one has a spouse or does not.  
Nevertheless, in reality couples are closer at some times than at others, with the loss of a spouse 
through death being the most extreme separation.  Recognizing a spectrum of experience might 
enable a widow or widower to recognize similarities between her/his current situation and earlier 
days when war, job demands, or demands of other relatives reduced the experience of being a 
couple, while still feeling the presence of the partner in her/his life.  Similarly, while an elderly 
person may no longer be employed after approximately fifty years on a job, by rejecting 
dichotomous ways of thinking, a person might be able to think of other times when employment 
seemed less important to self-identity (e.g., early years when one only worked in order to finance 
being with friends, or when having young children seemed to occupy the whole of one’s 
emotional energy).  The loss of a loved one or of employment and its satisfaction and 
socialization is sad.  But the loss of identity associated with being part of a couple or with being 
employed (e.g., being a teacher) can make the sadness worse.  Avoiding or softening the 
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dichotomous ways of viewing the pairs that make up identity (active/inactive, employed/out-of-
work) might reduce the emotional burden associated with the losses that inevitably occur in the 
later decades of life.   
The fear of death and dying is another psychological factor that contributes to ageism.  
People commonly link together aging with death because they believe that the older we become, 
the closer we find ourselves to death.  However, death can and does occur at any age.  As Sara 
Ruddick explains, “death is the terminus not of aging, but of life.”  Dealing with the fear of death 
is a lifelong task (Ruddick, 1999).  A person who has never experienced a death may not fully 
understand death and may never have managed her feelings about it.  In fact, some people have 
even developed an intense fear about dying.  As a result, the feelings harbored about death may 
be expressed in the form of discrimination toward and devaluation of the elderly.  After all, our 
society is dedicated, even arguably obsessed with defeating death (Gadow, Spring 1996).  
Offering an analysis similar to Young’s, Sally Gadow explains that our society’s “central values 
include autonomy and productivity.”  Therefore it seems rational “to marginalize those who are 
physically and financially dependent” (pg. 36).  Because most elderly are unable to be a 
productive part of our society, it is easier for people to view death as natural for them.  Gadow 
describes this as the age/death connection: “The construction of death as natural in old age saves 
rationalism by sleight of hand, making (some) death socially tolerable by making (all) old age 
tolerable” (pg. 37).                  
It is a combination of social, cultural, historical, and psychological factors that contribute 
to ageism.  In turn, ageism likely plays a role in physicians’ development of a preconception that 
elderly persons are unable to participate in conversations about their care.  Ageism, coupled with 
features of the medical environment may lead many medical professionals to believe that elderly 
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patients as a whole are unable to understand the complex medical jargon that may accompany a 
discussion about medical care.  In addition, physicians are busy, and as a result of both the 
profession and a culture that encourages people to work and move at a fast pace, they may feel as 
if they do not have the time to properly explain the technicalities of a medical decision to an 
elderly patient, especially an elderly patient with some degree of dementia.  They find it easier 
and perhaps less time consuming to provide medical information to a family member who is 
often of a younger age than the patient herself.   
Also playing a role in a physician’s disregard for an elderly demented patient’s 
participation in her care is sexism, characterized as beliefs and attitudes reflecting stereotypes 
regarding a person’s sex or gender, rather than individual attributes, as well as discriminatory 
actions based on those beliefs.  There seem to be two ways in which sexism may affect 
physician’s treatment of the demented elderly.  First, women are disproportionately represented 
among the elderly.  At any age, men typically have a higher death rate than women, which by old 
age results in a disproportionate number of elderly women.  In 1994, there were 20 million 
elderly women to 14 million elderly men, ages 65 and older.  This is a ratio of three to two. As 
age increases, the difference in the number of elderly men and women grows larger.  At ages 65 
to 69, the ratio is six women to every five men, and at ages 85 and older, the difference increases 
five to two (Bernstein, May 1995).  As a result, any actions by physicians, including those that 
exclude elderly demented patients from participating in their care, are going to affect 
disproportionately more women than men.  In this sense, sexism results from, but does not cause 
physicians’ discriminatory actions.  In effect, a sexist outcome occurs:  more women are 
excluded from participation in their care than men. 
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Sexism plays a second more important and more obviously sexist role in the treatment of 
the elderly, particularly the demented elderly.  It seems that whether they are male or female, as 
they age, people are gendered female.  To be “gendered female” means to be viewed and treated 
in ways that are associated with being female.  Given Young’s idea of dichotomous thinking 
discussed earlier, being treated in ways associated with being female really means to be treated 
as not ideally male, or as no longer fulfilling the ideal of male, i.e., as no longer rational, active, 
able-bodied, present in the public sphere, independent, and so on.   
This phenomenon of the elderly becoming gendered as female occurs for a couple of 
reasons.  Most elderly people are eventually in need of care.  As was discussed in the previous 
section on ageism, this care need is often the result of diminished or even near total loss of 
mental and physical capabilities.  These elders are now in a position of dependence and 
vulnerability as a result of their care needs (Tronto, 1993).  To be vulnerable and dependent on 
another closely resembles another stage in a person’s life:  childhood.  Children are dependent on 
their parents for shelter, food, and care.  In quite the same way, an elder also becomes dependent 
on another to provide for these needs.  Traditionally, women were also considered dependent and 
vulnerable.  The conventional family of the 1950s was composed of a working man and a stay-
at-home woman whose duty was to be a mother to her children.  She was, most often, without an 
income and left to depend on her husband financially.  She was vulnerable and relatively 
powerless, a care-receiver, much like many of the elders today who are left to depend on their 
adult children and their nursing facilities.  Also, women typically have the intimate duties of 
care-giving, while men have the more powerful public-sphere duties of caring about and taking 
care of (Tronto, 1993).  However, no matter a person’s sex, an elderly person comes to be 
gendered female as a consequence of the position occupied in the hierarchy of the phases of care.  
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An elder, like a woman or child, is most often in the position of care-receiver, as opposed to 
care-giver or the person who takes care of care needs.  This position of dependence, 
vulnerability, and relative powerlessness of the elderly resembles that of a woman and a child, 
not a (stereotypical or ideal) man. 
A second way that old age is gendered female concerns the idea of life as a career.  This 
career fits into three age periods:  youth, adulthood, and old age.  In a culture where productivity 
is central to being considered an important part of society, these three age periods in a person’s 
life match with the career stages in a person’s life: schooling, work, and retirement.  Unlike 
school and work, however, retirement is not typically a place of learning, a time of development 
of abilities and skills, or an activity that will place a person in a position to benefit society.  
Without any kind of productive role in society, the idea of life as a career makes retirement seem 
like the end of life, even if a person has many years of life remaining (Walker, 1999).  The 
retirement stage of a person’s life is different, though, for a man and a woman.  By retirement, a 
man has lived his youth and adulthood as a series of public-sphere roles that together fashioned a 
career.  He has had the roles as a son and student, husband, father, head of household, and 
worker.  Then upon reaching retirement, he finds himself “role-less” (Walker, 1999). A woman, 
on the other hand, has had a different “career” formed through domestic responsibilities and 
raising children; her role has been defined in terms of the needs of others.  In her later years, she 
may also find herself without her previously defined role as a care-giver, without someone to 
care for, and may instead, find herself in need of care.  Because most elderly women outlive their 
male companions, they will often be left widows without even a spouse to care for.  The role of 
women as stay-at-home wives and mothers who were not productive in the public sector in terms 
of earning an income for their family, leaves them without a publically recognized, socially 
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valued, career-related role, much as men experience upon reaching the retirement age.  In 
retirement, without a socially valued role, men, like women throughout their lives, are seen as 
without a social role, as no longer promoting the productivity of the society (Walker, 1999).  In 
this way, according to this life-as-career model, role-less retirement-age elderly men are 
gendered female.  Their role, or lack thereof, is feminized, assimilated to the traditional female 
role-lessness.        
Finally, Young addresses the dichotomy between reason and feeling, which has particular 
relevance to old age and the way that it is feminized.  “The bourgeois world instituted a moral 
division of labor between reason and sentiment, identifying masculinity with reason and 
femininity with sentiment and desire” (pg. 110).  In addition, the public and private realms 
depend on this dichotomy. “The impartiality and rationality of the state depend on containing 
need and desire in the private realm of the family.  The public realm of citizens achieves unity 
and universality only by defining the civil individual in opposition to the disorder of womanly 
nature, which embraces feeling, sexuality, birth and death, the attributes that concretely 
distinguish persons from one another.  The universal citizen is disembodied, dispassionate (male) 
reason.” (pg. 110) Thus, women have traditionally been omitted from the public realm (Young, 
1990); even when women do participate in the public sphere, they are expected to avoid 
emotionalism, perhaps to an even greater degree than male counterparts. 
This prizing of the avoidance of emotionality has particular relevance for consideration of 
old age and for understanding how being old is gendered female.  In addition to the dependence, 
vulnerability, and feeling of being without a social role experienced by an elderly man, many 
may begin to express emotions they once concealed in fear they would not be seen as the calm 
and composed man expected by society.  An elderly man may vocalize his love for family 
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members, find himself choked up when speaking about a sentimental memory, or even tear when 
watching a sad movie.  These are the emotions traditionally reserved for women and kept in the 
private sector of society, but when expressed by men, advance the notion of elderly men as 
gendered female.  This increased emotionality may result from the greater opportunity to express 
emotion, as the elderly are more outside of the public sphere and in more intimate space and 
care-receiving relationships, as well as from the subtle erosion of psychological control over 
emotion (“filters” and “controls”) that is sometimes witnessed among older people. 
Sexist attitudes and discriminatory actions thus affect the treatment of the elderly in a 
couple of ways.  First, because any systematic way of treating the elderly will have a 
disproportionate effect on women who constitute a a larger proportion of the elderly population, 
especially the old old.  Second, because sexist attitudes may result in less than optimal, unethical, 
treatment of the elderly as both male and female elders are devalued as old age is feminized.  As 
a result of being feminized or gendered as female, elderly patients, particularly the demented 
who lack rational cognitive abilities while often retaining emotional responsiveness, may 
experience features of the doctor-patient relationship typical of the experience of female patients.  
Female patients are often viewed as being weaker than their male counterparts; their pain reports, 
for example, are taken less seriously (Wolf, 1996).  Physicians have traditionally thought of 
female patients as lacking courage to deal with the physical hardship and emotional burden of 
serious illness and have hidden diagnoses from them (Wolf, 1996).  Moreover, women are 
viewed as craving relationship and also as being compliant with authority figures (Wolf, 1996).  
Similarly, elderly demented patients, even the mildly demented, may be viewed as unable to 
cope with bad news, as not wanting to participate in healthcare decision making, and as willing 
to settle for any sort of relationship with the doctor, even one which is not truly relational and 
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attentive to their needs and abilities as individuals.  This is especially true given the traditional 
view of elderly demented patients as child-like and dependent. 
Finally, because many patients, even those with intact cognitive abilities, do not want to 
retain decisional authority regarding medical decisions (Schneider, 1998), because this view is 
more prevalent among elderly patients (Schneider, 1998), and because many demented patients 
lack cognitive ability requisite to retain decisional authority, many physicians may leap to the 
conclusion that elderly demented patients do not want to participate in decision making at all.  
This leap is a product of the sort of dichotomous all-or-nothing reasoning that Young criticizes.  
Just as the dichotomous world view results in ageism and sexism, it leads to the third bias that 
impedes the involvement of the elderly demented in their care, namely, hypercognitivism. 
There are two senses of hypercognitivism.  The first and more fundamental sense is the 
idea of placing very high value on cognition and rationality.  The second, resulting from the first, 
is the idea that a higher moral status and personhood should be given to individuals possessing 
full cognitive abilities (Post, Spring 1998).  This sense of hypercognitivism views cognition as 
the criterion of personhood.  
As in Young’s analysis, dominate patterns of Western thought create dichotomies 
between the attributes associated with the dyad of male/female.  One example of these 
dichotomies is rational versus irrational, emotional, and spiritual.  If rationality is deemed 
desirable, as it is within Western society, then emotionality, irrationality, and spirituality are 
deemed undesirable or even detrimental.  Under this sense of hypercognitive thinking, high value 
is placed on rationality, and thus, high value is placed on those persons who are reasonable, 
logical, composed, and objective.  Those persons who possess the opposite of such valuable 
attributes are not valued as persons and are therefore degraded.  Such valorizing of rationality 
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places at a disadvantage within our society those individuals who are irrational, such as those 
persons suffering from dementia.  Holding such a hypercognitivist view might lead people to 
choose medical interventions that had the greatest chance of preserving or promoting a patient’s 
cognitive abilities, perhaps at the expense of other goods (like comfort) or might lead them to 
discount the value of interventions that do not preserve cognition but that afford other sorts of 
benefit.               
Given this prizing of rationality, it is little wonder that some consider the capacity for 
rational cognition to be the mark of being a person.  A hypercognitivist account of personhood 
would contend either that only those with such capacities, either currently or potentially, are 
persons, or at least would accord higher moral value to those who possess full cognitive abilities.   
Under these hypercognitivist theories of personhood, severely demented persons are not 
recognized as persons at all, or in any case, they are not given the same status as those persons 
who have all their cognitive abilities intact.  By considering demented individuals as nonpersons 
or as persons with diminished moral status, these individuals are deprived of recognition of the 
emotional, value, and relational facets of human dignity, as well as being deprived of the 
opportunity to exercise what minimal cognitive capacities may remain despite the dementia 
(Post, Spring 1998).  Arguing against such hypercognitivist views, Steven G. Post claims that 
“persons who lack certain empowering cognitive capacities are not nonpersons; rather, they have 
become the weakest among us and are worthy of care.”  He also asserts that “the hypercognitivist 
value system that shapes personhood theories of ethics is merely an example of how our 
culture’s criteria of rationality and productivity blind us to other ways of thinking about the 
meaning of our humanity and the nature of humane care” (pg. 72).  Like Young, Post criticizes a 
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dichotomous approach, the all-or-nothing way of viewing cognition and the all-or-nothing way 
of viewing persons based upon their cognitive capacity.   
If physicians embrace a hypercognitivist value system, they may indeed fail to view a 
demented patient as a person.  The content of medical training may provide a reasonable 
explanation for physicians’ high value of rationality and their adoption of a hypercognitivist 
attitude.  Medical students are admitted to medical school largely on the basis of their ability to 
demonstrate acute cognitive abilities and rational thought.  Their undergraduate science training 
is a prerequisite for admission.  Their overall and quantitative scores on the Medical College 
Admissions Test (MCAT) are critical for admission.  Then, they endure four years of medical 
training, studying mostly science.  During their clinical years, the teaching of evidence-based 
medicine is crowding out teaching students to pursue their hunches.  Medicine is increasingly a 
science, not an art.  Moreover, as Tronto observes, it was only when the medical profession 
became associated with science that it moved from being a low social status, care-giving career 
to being a high social status profession (Tronto, 1993).  Physicians aligned themselves with the 
rational and scientific and gained status in doing so. 
Moreover, there are psychological reasons for physicians to avoid too much emotion in 
their practice.  In the profession, many will cut open patients, remove and replace organs, 
witness patients suffer from incurable or untreatable diseases, and watch as patients die.  As a 
result, many learn to avoid expressing emotion, and maybe even experiencing it, as a way to 
establish the distance necessary to continue to perform these necessary tasks on a daily basis.  
Physicians even learn to elude close relationships with patients for fear that those relationships 
may develop into deep emotional connections which may interfere with their performance as 
physicians.  As Tronto discusses, physicians are encouraged to perform less of the caring role.  
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Those physicians who receive the highest status among their colleagues are the ones who do the 
least amount of direct care work, but instead are at the forefront of research in their field.  They 
pass most of the caring aspect of the profession to another, often a nurse whose responsibility is 
to care and connect emotionally with a patient (Tronto, 1993).  As a consequence of having a 
hypercognitivist value system, physicians may not find worth in a demented elderly patient’s 
participation in treatment decisions or her expression of preferences regarding her care. 
The notions of ageism, sexism, and hypercognitivism intersect to make elderly, demented 
persons, perhaps women more than men, at a greater risk for oppression and discrimination 
within our society.  Physicians and other medical professionals may be knowingly or 
unknowingly acting upon the age, gender, or cognitivist biases that are present within our culture 
and that prevent them from deeming it compulsory to include elderly demented patients in their 
care or the planning of their care.  The next section discusses how the intersection of these biases 
has more than a merely additive negative effect for the elderly demented.   
2.2 THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERSECTIONALITY OF AGEISM, SEXISM, 
AND HYPERCOGNITIVISM ON PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR 
This section explores the notion of intersectionality and considers it as a method of analysis.  As 
an example, it examines the way in which the intersectionality of ageism, sexism, and 
hypercognitivism, affected the way that courts constructed preferences for incompetent patients 
with regard to end-of-life decisions.  It takes up this topic because the reasoning of the courts, as 
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reconstructed by Steven H. Miles and Allison August, illustrates the way that physicians may 
think, albeit less self-consciously and explicitly, about the elderly demented patients they see. 
     Intersectionality is a method in feminist thought that is used to understand the ways in 
which concepts of discrimination interact, usually with a exponential negative effect. 
An intersectional approach to analyzing the disempowerment of marginalized 
women attempts to capture the consequences of the interaction between two or 
more forms of subordination.  It addresses the manner in which racism, 
patriarchy, class oppression and other discriminatory systems create inequalities 
that structure the relative positions of women, races, ethnicities, classes, and the 
like.  Moreover, intersectionality addresses the way that specific acts and policies 
operate together to create further disempowerment. For instance, race, ethnicity, 
gender, or class, are often seen as separate spheres of experience which determine 
social, economic and political dynamics of oppression.  But, in fact, the systems 
often overlap and cross over each other, creating complex intersections at which 
two, or three or more of these axes may meet.  Indeed, racially subordinated 
women are often positioned in the space where racism or xenophobia, class and 
gender meet.  They are consequently subject to injury by the heavy flow of traffic 
traveling along all these roads ("Background Briefing on Intersectionality:  
Working Group on Women and Human Rights," 2001). 
 
Thus, women of color may not only be economically disadvantaged, but be economically 
disadvantaged, at least in part, because they are women and members of a racial minority.  
Moreover, their being a member of a racial minority might not matter in the same ways if they 
were not also female or poor.  In other words, a rich Black woman may live in material 
conditions much more like those of a rich White woman than those of a poorer Black woman.  
Or, being poor and Black she might have different opportunities open to her than if she were 
poor, Black, and male.  While poor Black men are at higher risk of violent death than their 
female counterparts, they may have more paths toward social status and acceptance open to them 
than poor Black women.  Intersectionality is a method of analysis that attempts to recognize and 
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analyze the interconnected, overlapping, and synergistic ways that features of a situation act to 
privilege or disempower people. 
One such analysis is of gender differences within court decisions made regarding “right 
to die” cases (Miles and August, Spring-Summer 1990).4  Although those studying the cases, 
Steven H. Miles and Allison August, focused on gender bias, the effects of ageism and 
hypercognitivism are also evident.  They discovered that treatment preferences regarding 
whether the patient would have exercised the right to die, if competent to do so, were constructed 
by the courts for 75% of male patients, but only 14% of female patients.  This pattern, of 
constructing preferences for male patients while leaving the decisions for female patients to 
family members, was witnessed over a 14 year period and was not attributable to chance, 
according to Miles and August.  It was also not affected by the state where the court was located, 
age of the patient, or whether or not the patient was comatose or supported by tube feedings 
(Miles and August, Spring-Summer 1990).  Even though age of the patient did not affect the 
trend or overall bias Miles and August identified, the effect of ageism in evident is some of the 
court’s language.     
Miles and August suggest reasons for this bias in constructing patient preferences.  
Granted, the reasons they propose relate to courts that made decisions on behalf of patients 
whose incompetence was a result of permanent unconsciousness, while demented patients are 
mostly incompetent while consciousness remains.  Still, many of the reasons suggested for the 
 
4 This section does is not intended to argue that physicians discriminate more heavily with respect to their 
female demented patients rather than male demented patients; this discussion is intended only to suggest that a 
gender bias may occur and that women may be more affected by sexism than men. 
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bias in the courts may provide some insight as to why physicians exclude demented patients in 
the planning their care. 
The first reason Miles and August offer for the gender difference is the court’s view that 
a man’s judgment is deemed rational, while a woman’s is labeled as emotional.  A man is seen as 
exercising careful deliberation and consideration, even in remarks made about end-of-life issues 
to his friends and family.  Even when men’s emotions are recounted to the court, they are viewed 
as “passionate convictions,” rather than resulting from a “disordered mind” (pg.88).    A woman, 
on the other hand, is seen as remarking out of emotion or as a reaction to a painful or stressful 
experience.  Women and their remarks are even characterized as childlike.  Their comments, 
often considered “off-hand,” are considered not to reflect any careful thought, and are therefore, 
frequently disregarded by the courts (Miles and August, Spring-Summer 1990)(pg. 90). 
Second, the courts considered women to lack the capacity to make moral decisions 
relating to health care.  This is shown in the text of the decisions made by the courts.  These 
decisions were made without any regard to or mention of the woman’s values.  When a decision 
was made to remove life-prolonging measures, it was made either because a written advanced 
directive existed or because family could show a consistent pattern of decision making with prior 
medical decisions made by the patient (Miles and August, Spring-Summer 1990).  Third, the 
courts used different standards when examining the evidence of a man’s preferences than a 
woman’s preferences.  It seems that courts only constructed past preferences for a woman when 
a very specific remark was made, while the court was willing to accept more general remarks to 
construct the preferences for a male patient.  Past preferences were also constructed for a male 
patient simply based on his character.  In contrast, even when a woman made a very specific 
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remark regarding life-prolonging measures, the remark is often portrayed as emotional and 
discarded (Miles and August, Spring-Summer 1990). 
Lastly, “life support dependent men are seen as subjected to medical assault; women are 
seen as vulnerable to medical neglect” (Miles and August, Spring-Summer 1990) (pg. 87).  Men 
on life support are viewed by the court as in jeopardy of being seen as dehumanized and in a 
condition that is degrading.  Women, on the other hand, are seen as vulnerable and in need of 
aid.  The family of a female patient may, for example, be viewed as having motives contrary to 
those of the patient when the family supports termination of life-sustaining treatment.  As a result 
of this vulnerability, it is considered justified to seek court approval for surrogate medical 
decisions made on behalf of female patients (Miles and August, Spring-Summer 1990). 
The parallels between the situation of the courts regarding incompetent (because 
permanently unconscious) patients and that of physicians viewing their elderly demented patients 
are instructive.  To feel vulnerable within the context of medical care is not unique to end-of-life 
situations; rather, to be in a position where care is needed to is be is a situation of vulnerability 
(Tronto, 1993).  The experience of vulnerability is also not exclusive to a woman. Both a men 
and women can find themselves needing care, and hence in a position of vulnerability.  Tronto 
explains, “Vulnerability belies the myth that we are always autonomous, and potentially equal, 
citizens” (pg. 135).  During a person’s life, he or she will go through periods of vulnerability, as 
well as dependence and autonomy.  When a patient requires care from a person, the patients is 
put in a position vulnerability, which in turn, places the patient in an unequal relationship of 
authority (Tronto, 1993).  For a demented patient, the unequal relationship may be quite 
common.  However, it may not be the patient’s vulnerability that is the primary issue within this 
type of physician-patient relationship.  The physician may recognize her own vulnerabilities or 
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fear of dependence when caring for a demented patient.  Her own trepidation regarding old age 
may prevent her from including demented patients in conversations about care.  To omit a 
demented patient from these types of conversations furthers the inequality of the relationship 
between the physician and patient thereby making the physician feel powerful and in control. 
The feeling of power, as well as lack of inclusion of the patient in conversations, averts the 
physician from facing her own fears and vulnerabilities regarding her future. 
Additionally, many physicians may hold biases in regard to their elderly demented 
patients.  They may see their patients in a way similar to the way the court system viewed 
terminally ill, incompetent female patients.  They may see their female patients as emotional and 
easily pressured to surrender control of their care to their physician.  They may view elderly men 
in terms of the “life as a career” approach and see them as no longer valuable to our society 
given that their age and then their dementia has left them role-less.  A person who is no longer a 
value to society may also be viewed as not useful as a participating member of a medical 
conversation.  Many of their elderly patients may be poor and lack adequate health care 
coverage.  Often, being poor is equated with being powerless.  These preconceptions and 
prejudices are not always expressed or acted upon independent of each other, but rather they may 
be tacit and may interact to further discrimination and negative attitudes.  The intersection of 
ageism, sexism, and hypercognitivism may place the demented elderly, and especially women, at 
a greater risk for suffering discrimination within our society and a lack of involvement in the 
planning of their care or the informed consent process.  
In addition to the influence of the intersectionality of ageism, sexism, and 
hypercognitivism on physicians, another issue may lead physicians to fail to involve demented 
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elders in their care.  Physicians may also interpret the role of involvement in decision making 
differently.  This idea is analyzed in the following section. 
2.3 PHYSICIAN INTERPRETATION OF INVOLVEMENT 
The argument of this paper has been that demented patients may lack decisional capacity, but can 
still be involved in the planning of their care and, to some extent, the informed consent 
procedure.  However, the idea of “involvement” seems to suggest different actions depending not 
only on the cognitive capacities of the patient, but also on the values and beliefs of the physician.  
There are at least two ways in which involvement could be interpreted by a physician.  First, 
there is the dichotomous way of thinking of involvement:  a patient can either participate 
completely in decision making and the informed consent process, in which the patient retains 
decisional authority, or the patient cannot participate at all.  If the patient lacks competence or 
lacks the cognitive abilities to participate in an informed way in the discussion (even if 
decisional authority rests with a surrogate decisionmaker), a physician who embraces this 
dichotomous way of thinking of involvement may either ignore the patient, or may “include” her 
in a most condescending way, treating her like a child, cajoling her into compliance, often using 
the pronoun ‘we’ as though to include her.  Such a physician may ask, “Are we ready to be 
examined today, Mrs. Jones?” without expecting or respecting a response. 
There is, however, a second way of conceiving of involving a patient in her care.  This 
second approach considers involvement along a spectrum.  At one end is the ideal of a fully 
involved, competent patient who retains decisional authority, participates actively in the 
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informed consent process, and expresses her treatment decision.  Moving away from this ideal, 
there may be ways to involve patients who lack decisional capacity, but who retain the ability to 
understand (though not reason and deliberate adequately) and who are able to express relevant 
preferences and values.  At the other end of the spectrum would be the generally inexpressive, 
noncomprehending patient, who nevertheless may occasionally express what may be construed 
as preferences either by exhibiting degrees of pleasure or pain, or by uttering refusals as opposed 
to complying easily with treatment interventions and care-giving. 
First, as was discussed in the first chapter, decisional capacity is the ability to declare 
goals and values, understand information, weigh options according to preferences and values, 
and communicate a decision.  An autonomous patient is able to complete these four tasks in 
order to make an informed medical decision.  A demented patient, on the other hand, is not 
autonomous, meaning that she is unable to make an informed medical decision.  Many 
physicians recognize this inability and deem demented patients unable to participate in medical 
decisions.  They have adopted an all-or-nothing approach to healthcare decision making. 
Second, at the end of the dementia continuum is the severe form of this syndrome.  At 
this end, demented elders often possess the cognitive capacity that resembles a child.  A person 
with late stage Alzheimer’s disease will have lost most of her memory and have immense 
difficulty recognizing otherwise familiar friends, family, objects, and places.  She may have 
trouble walking, often becoming unsteady on her feet.  She may also have trouble eating, 
controlling her bladder and bowels, and may have trouble speaking and understanding speech at 
certain times ("Facts about Dementia," 2007).  The problems that are experienced by patients 
suffering from severe forms dementia are many of the same issues experienced by children.  As a 
result, physicians seem to perceive severely demented patients as children and treat them 
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accordingly.  Physicians lean in or bend down to speak with them, use an elevated tone, and offer 
rewards.  Additionally, many physicians will even touch the patient on the arm or knee, almost 
condescendingly, perhaps forgetting that these are adult patients and that demented patients are 
not children.           
It is typical for persons to lose, to some extent, their ability to understand and retain new 
information as they age, and dementia may in fact lead to a greater loss of this ability.  However, 
this is only a generalization, and a patient needs to be assessed in order to determine her capacity 
to make a decision, as the symptoms of dementia exist on a continuum.    It seems as though 
physicians have failed to understand that there are cognitive capacities of a demented patient that 
still exist.  Moreover, the patronizing of an adult male or female is not the same as inclusion in 
the planning of care.   Perhaps some demented patients cannot articulate or communicate a 
decision, while others cannot weigh the options according to their values.  Despite these 
cognitive deficiencies, demented patients can participate in their care.  Many can express their 
values about certain treatments or even about life in general.  Healthcare decisions can often be 
inferred from these values and preferences.   
There are some ways in which physicians can positively reconceptualize old age and 
involve patients in their care.  For example, instead of viewing life as a career in which elderly 
men and women are left with a feeling of role-lessness upon reaching old age, it may be more 
appropriate to view life as a journey.  Margaret Walker refers to this view of life as “a lateral 
integration of life” (pg. 107).  She describes this view as embodying “no eventually unfufillable 
demand for achievement or progress; it requires only normal awareness, capacities for feeling, 
and opportunities to belong to or with something other than or larger than oneself.  The meanings 
in such a life are many, and we do not wholly control much less create them” (pg. 107).  Life as a 
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journey sees a person’s life as a continuous course that may be slowed down or stopped at times 
and that may be affected by things that cause the person to not always follow the straight path 
that is required for the view of life as a career.  Instead of seeing life as linked to age or stages 
marked by phases in career, life is viewed as a series of lessons learned, pleasures, relationships, 
experiences, and events.  To see life as a journey is to see your life as a part of the lives of other 
people, like family, friends, and partners (Walker, 1999).  This way of viewing life, contrary to 
seeing life as a career, helps to eliminate the idea that life ends at old age or when a person loses 
cognitive capacity due to dementia, when a person can no longer be a productive member of 
society.  Instead old age is marked by new and changing relationships, finding new pleasures, 
and enjoying new experiences. 
Additionally, Sally Gadow suggests a model of personal engagement between a patient 
and her physician.  “In that engagement, both persons are present as moral (not rational) agents, 
confirming or declining the meanings that each offers the other, until a narrative is composed 
about health and aging that both can accept.  Their relational narrative is the reconstruction of 
their situation together, it has no wider validity” (Gadow, Spring 1996) (pg. 39).  This paper 
argues that although most elderly demented patients do not possess the decisional authority to 
make decisions, they are still able to participate in their care.  It may be that demented patients 
lack the ability to compose a narrative in a traditional linear sense; however, they can still play a 
role in the narratives of others-their families and professional care-givers-so that the idea of 
doctor and patient interacting to compose an acceptable narrative is still an instructive one.  
Physicians need to ask questions to determine each demented patient’s individual level of 
decisional capacity and then engage patients by speaking to them directly, avoiding language that 
equates these adult patients to children.  They need to actively seek their preferences and values 
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at the level that each patient is able to communicate them and determine the good each patient 
seeks for her life.  Physicians should attempt, insofar as possible, to recognize and confront their 
biased attitudes and actions stemming from the intersection of ageism, sexism, and 
hypercognitivism.  Then, they should attempt to see each patient as a unique individual capable 
of some degree of participation in the planning of her care and attempt to create conditions 
necessary to facilitate that degree of involvement.   
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